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Abstract: The current study explored the looking behaviours of young children with Autism Spectrum 
Disorders (ASD), Williams syndrome (WS), and typically developing (TD) children while they were 
administered a low-verbal Theory of Mind (ToM) task. Although ToM performance in both clinical 
groups was impaired, only participants with WS showed small differences in looking behaviour at the 
start of the video. Furthermore, while TD children who passed the ToM task looked longer at the 
original hiding place there was no such contrast in the clinical groups. This shows that looking 
behaviour in ASD and WS is not necessarily atypical when saliency aspects such as language, 
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 This is the first study to explore looking behaviour of children with ASD 
and WS during a Theory of Mind task containing dynamic stimuli 
 The WS group have difficulties disengaging from faces rather than just a 
preference for faces per se 
 The ASD group did not show avoidance of looking at the faces in favour of 
objects or looking at the background. 





It is now well established that Theory of Mind (ToM) ability forms a platform for the 
development of socio-cognitive abilities, such as understanding of the intentions and 
behaviour of others (Premack and Woodruff 1978). The nature and theoretical interpretation 
of ToM has become a focus in developmental and neurocognitive research and has sparked a 
wide range of paradigms. Studies have shown a clear progression on the acquisition of ToM 
abilities with typically developing (TD) children aged 4 years and younger passing simple 
ToM tasks (Wimmer and Perner 1983; Liszkowski et al. 2008), while more complex ToM 
abilities continue to develop into adulthood (Apperly et al., 2011). In contrast, individuals 
with developmental disorders, such as Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) and Williams 
syndrome (WS), have been found to be impaired on ToM tests, even when their mental age 
exceeds that of a 4 year old (Baron-Cohen et al. 1997; Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan 2000).  
 
WS is a rare neurodevelopmental disorder (about 1 in 20 000 live births) caused by a 
deletion of some 28 genes on the long arm of one copy of chromosome 7 at q11.23 (Donnai 
and Karmiloff-Smith 2000). Despite an overall lower IQ of 50-70, individuals with WS show 
an uneven cognitive profile, with good performance on receptive vocabulary and face 
recognition in contrast to non-verbal abilities such as number, planning, visuo-spatial 
abilities, and route learning (Van Herwegen et al. 2011). Although individuals with WS are 
inclined to be overly sociable (Mervis et al. 2000), their performance on tasks that assess 
cognitive aspects of social development is impaired. This has led researchers to conclude that 
the social profile in WS might be uneven as well with the social perceptual components being 
intact but the socio-perceptual component being impaired (Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan 
2000). However, more recent studies have found that participants with WS also show 
difficulties on tasks that tap into socio-perceptual abilities (for example Plesa-Skwerer et al 
2006). 
 
In contrast, Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a common neurodevelopmental 
syndrome (1 in 100) characterised by two core impairments in communication or social 
behaviour and repetitive behaviours from early childhood onwards (American Psychological 
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Association 2013). While there are marked individual differences in the extent and quality of 
the symptoms amongst individuals with ASD, one of the most common features is a striking 
difficulty with social skills, including the ability to attend to faces and difficulties in emotion 
recognition (Klin et al. 2002; Riby et al. 2011a). However, not all studies have found that 
individuals with ASD have an aversion towards faces and atypical looking behaviour towards 
faces and impaired emotion recognition has been found for static stimuli but not always for 
dynamic stimuli (Back et al. 2007; Speer et al. 2007). 
 
Although there are many contrasting features between the individuals with ASD and 
WS, there are also several commonalities in their behavioural and cognitive profiles (Lincoln 
et al. 2007). For instance, both groups show socio-communication problems such as delayed 
use of pointing, unusual eye contact and problems with joint attention (Charman et al.1997; 
Klein-Tasman et al. 2007; Laing et al. 2002). In addition, impairment on ToM tasks has been 
reported in both clinical groups. For example, Baron-Cohen and colleagues (1985) reported 
that 80% of individuals with autism failed the change-of-location task Sally-Ann in which 
participants are asked to follow a scenario where Sally leaves a marble in a basket and Anne 
moves the marble to a box while Sally is away. Individuals with ASD responded incorrectly 
to the false-belief question of the Sally-Ann task by answering that Sally should look in the 
box where the marble had moved to rather than in the box Sally believed the marble to be in. 
Similarly, participants with WS fail this task as well (Tager-Flusberg and Sulliven 2000; Van 
Herwegen et al. 2013). Because of the differences and similarities in their social and 
cognitive profiles, contrasting performance of individuals with ASD to WS allows us to 
explore the cognitive mechanisms that underlie task performance, including theory of mind 
tasks. 
 
Several domain specific theories have been proposed as to why individuals with ASD 
and WS might fail ToM tasks: for example performance on ToM tasks might be caused by 
the language impairments observed in WS and ASD (Tager-Flusberg 2000; Happé 1995). 
Yet, others suggest executive functioning and the use of context, are better predictors 
(Pellicano 2010; Van Herwegen et al. 2013). Although several studies have shown evidence 
for a deficit to use context in WS and ASD (for a review see Bernardino et al. 2012 as well as 
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Happé and Frith 2006), studies in ASD have shown that this cannot explain performance on 
ToM tasks (Burnette et al. 2005; Happé 1997).  
 
One reason why the current theories cannot describe the difficulties observed in ASD 
and WS is that they only focus on domain-specific areas of cognition to explain ToM deficits. 
Recent evidence has suggested that impairments in domain-general abilities, such as attention 
or where in a visual scene a person was looking for detailed information, can explain 
impairments in domain-specific areas later on in life (Karmiloff-Smith et al. 2012). Thus, it is 
possible that subtle differences in looking behaviour or where a person was looking for 
detailed information can provide valuable information about what strategies individuals use 
to complete a task and whether task approach in WS and ASD is typical or atypical which in 
turn might provide an explanation for the task performance in ASD and WS on ToM tasks.  
 
Previous eye tracking studies in participants with WS and ASD have shown that they 
show atypical attention patterns during social tasks. Riby and Hancock (2009) found that in 
human videos individuals with WS aged 8 to 28 years old spend more time looking at faces 
and less at the actors’ bodies compared to controls while participants with ASD of a similar 
age looked less at the faces compared to the controls. It has been suggested that these atypical 
looking behaviours are related to the social abilities of individuals with WS and ASD and that 
atypical attentional bias toward others' faces could contribute to atypical social orienting 
(Kikuchi et al. 2009). For example, Klin and colleagues (2002) showed that adolescents with 
ASD focussed more on the mouth and less on the eye region while watching black and white 
video clips from the film “who is afraid of Virginia Woolf”, in contrast to TD controls. They 
also found that looking behaviour predicted social competence in ASD: those who spend 
longer fixating on the mouth were more sociable, while there was a negative correlation for 
sociability and the time fixating objects. This suggests that atypical looking behaviours might 
also cause problems for task performance on theory of mind tasks (see also, Senju et al. 
2010). However, none of these studies have directly examined whether individuals with WS 
and ASD show atypical looking behaviour during a ToM task and whether these looking 
behaviours can actually explain ToM deficits.  
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The current study is the first to explore the looking behaviours of participants with 
ASD and WS whilst performing a ToM task. Based upon previous studies, it was 
hypothesised that those with WS would fail the test questions as they would have difficulty to 
disengage from social stimuli which would prevent them from focusing on where the object 
had been hidden as well as where the object had been moved to. In contrast, those with ASD 
would fail the task as they would favour non-social stimuli in the background and thus they 
would have insufficient information to infer the deception included in the ToM task, as 
information about deception is especially visible in facial expressions. Thus, for both 
developmental disorders it was predicted that atypical looking behaviour would impair their 
focus on important information in the scene resulting in incorrect cognitive interpretations 




Fourteen children (4 male) with WS, 13 children with ASD (12 male) and a control 
group of 14 (5 male) typically developing (TD) children took part in the study. TD children 
were recruited through local primary schools and parents of children with ASD were 
contacted through mailing lists of local support groups, special needs schools and groups. 
The Williams Syndrome Foundation, UK assisted with recruitment of children with WS. 
Children with WS had been diagnosed clinically as well as by means of the fluorescence in 
situ hybridisation (FISH) test for microdeletion of genes at the elastic locus (7q11.22-11.23). 
Children in the ASD group met established criteria for autism, such as those specified in 
DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association 2013). They had an average score within the 
mild-to-moderate range for ASD (mean: 32.62, SD= 4.782, range: 27 to 40.5) on the 
Childhood Autism Rating Scale (CARS: Schopler et al. 1988). Ethical approval was granted 
by the Middlesex University Research Ethics Committee and supported by the Williams 
Syndrome Foundation, UK. Both parental informed consent and the child’s assent were 
obtained prior to participation. All participants were white and came from a mainly working 
class background, with a similar Social Economic Status. There was no significant difference 
in chronological ages between the groups (F(2,40)= 0.611, p= 0.542). Table 1 provides an 
overview of the chronological ages of the three groups. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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Clinical groups were matched to the TD children on chronological age since the 
dependent variable in the current study focuses on looking behaviours (and pointing), i.e., 
non-verbal and implicit abilities for which no direct mental age equivalent scores are 
available. However, as this is likely to disadvantage developmental groups who rarely 
perform at CA levels, performance on standardised tasks was obtained to evaluate their 
verbal and non-verbal abilities as well. 
Materials  
Background measures. Participants were administered the British Picture Vocabulary 
Scale (BPVS: Dunn et al. 1997) to obtain vocabulary comprehension scores and the Raven’s 
Coloured Progressive Matrices (RCPM: Raven et al. 1990) to obtain non-verbal performance 
scores. Due to the fact that scores for some participants in the clinical group were low on 
these tasks, and no age equivalent scores were available for these scores, raw scores were 
used instead. Although this approach does not allow comparison of the verbal versus non-
verbal abilities within each clinical group, it still allows investigation of any differences 
between the different groups.  
Low-verbal theory of mind task. This task consisted of a false belief task administered in 
Van Herwegen et al 2013. Participants were asked to watch one change-location ToM task 
similar to the classic ToM story of Sally-Ann. In the video, two protagonists (either two girls 
or two boys) are in a room, where there is a table with a basket and a box on. Protagonist A 
or “the seeker” has an object (either an apple or a game console). The seeker puts the object 
in the basket. The seeker yawns, stretches, and leaves the room. While the seeker is away, 
protagonist B or “the mover” goes to the basket and moves the object into the box. Then the 
mover leaves the room through a different door. When the seeker returns, the participant is 
asked a prediction of action question: “Where will this girl/boy look for the apple/game?” 
(Prediction question). Next, the participant was asked a reality question (“Where is the apple/ 
game now?”) and a memory question (“Where did the girl/boy put the apple/game?”). 
Participants answered these questions by pointing to a picture out of three options (a picture 
of the seeker looking into the basket, the seeker looking into the box and the seeker looking 
under the table). These pictures were presented from left to right on the screen in randomised 
order and a researcher who stood behind the participant recorded the participant’s answer.  
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For the eye-movement analyses the following dynamic area of interests (AOIs) were 
identified: 1) the face of the mover, 2) the face of the seeker, 3) hiding place one, and 4) 
hiding place two (see Figure 1) using an in-house software tool, Gazeatron (Võ, et al., 2012). 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 In order to investigate any differences in looking behaviour during particular moments 
in the task, six 3-second scenes in the video were identified: 1) the seeker hiding the object, 
2) the seeker leaves or moves backwards, 3) the mover retrieves the object, 4) the mover 
moves the object to new location, 5) the mover leaves the room or moves backwards, and 6) 
the seeker returns. 
Apparatus 
A Tobii eye-tracker was used to record eye position data at 120 Hz and the stimuli 
were presented on a 17–inch monitor. Eye-movement recordings were controlled with Tobii’s 
Studio software (version 2.01) while the experiments were controlled by E-prime software 
version 2.0 professional software.  
Procedure 
Participants were seated facing the eye tracker monitor at a distance of 60 cm. A 5-
point calibration was conducted before the participant watched the videos. Participants were 
asked to watch the video carefully as they would be asked some questions afterwards. The 
video took about 40 seconds. The percentage of lost data during the videos due to blinks or 
poor tracking did not differ significantly across the groups: TD group (mean = 18.19%, SD = 
8.62), WS group (mean= 17.62%, SD= 12.25), ASD group (mean = 23.89%, SD = 19.18), all 
ts < 2, and p-values > 0.5. In order to control for differences in length of the AOIs and to take 
into account the differences in data loss looking behaviour to each of the AOIs was calculated 
as a proportion of the total looking time on screen. 
Results 
Background measures 
A one-way ANOVA comparing BPVS results between the three groups, showed that 
there was a significant difference between the groups on the BPVS raw scores; F(2,23.627) = 
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6.278, p = .007
1
, 2 = .17 .  Games-Howell post-hoc comparisons showed that the WS group 
performed significantly lower compared to the TD group (p = .004). There were no other 
group differences (all p’s > .05). On the RCPM, several children decided not to complete the 
test (two participants with WS aged 8;0 and 9;10 years and three with ASD aged 4;03, 5;09 
and 9;11 years old). Again a one-way ANOVA showed a significant difference in RCPM 
scores between the three groups; F(2,35)= 35.659, p = .008, 2 = .26. However, as there were 
unequal group sizes, Gabriel post-hoc analyses were run which revealed a significant 
difference in scores between the TD and WS group (p = .006) but not the other groups (p > 
.05). These differences show that the WS group performed at a lower level than the control 
children (see Table 1). However, the fact that no differences were found between the ASD 
and WS group suggests that these two groups can be directly compared. 
Behavioural performance on low-verbal Theory of Mind task 
Although more participants with WS and ASD (number of WS = 64%; ASD = 38%) 
failed the prediction question in the false belief task compared to the TD group (21%), 
Fisher-Freeman-Halton tests
2
 showed that this difference did not reach significance (exact p = 
.068). However, there was a significant difference between the three groups for the reality 
question (exact p = .015) and the memory question (exact p = .011). As shown in Table 2, 
more children with WS failed the memory and reality questions compared to the two other 
groups. When performance on the prediction question was examined for those participants 
who passed the reality and memory questions only, a significant difference between the three 
groups (Fisher-Freeman-Halton test exact p = .044) was found with TD > ASD > WS. 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Overall differences in looking behaviour 
Group differences for proportion of total dwell time (i.e. cumulative fixation durations 
across multiple visits to the AOI relative to the total gaze time on screen) were investigated 
for each of the AOIs across the entire video (Table 3). One-way ANOVA tests were carried 
                                                          
1
 Welsh ANOVA was used since the homogeneity of variances assumption was violated. 
2
 These are extensions of the Fisher’s exact test for a 2 by 3 design (see http://vassarstats.net/fisher2x3.html) 
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out to investigate any group differences and Welsh ANOVAs were calculated when the 
assumption of equal variances was violated.  
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Comparisons between the three groups for overall time looking during the video did 
not show any differences for overall looking times; F(2,40)= .614, p= .547, 2= .033 which 
showed that all three groups engaged with the task in a similar way. More detailed 
investigation of the eyemovements towards the different aspects of the video showed that 
there was a significant difference for the face of the seeker; F(2, 22.096)= 4.096, p = .031, 2 
= .075. Games-Howell post-hoc tests showed that the WS group looked longer at the face of 
the seeker compared to the TD group (p = .026). All other post-hoc comparisons and other 
ANOVA comparisons were non-significant (all p’s > .05).   
Next, it was investigated whether there were any differences between the three groups 
in looking behaviour towards each of the AOIs during certain scenes within the videos. Again 
there were no significant differences (all p’s > .05).  
FIGURE 2 HERE 
Can looking behaviour explain performance on ToM task? 
Next, it was investigated whether there were any differences in looking behaviour 
between those who passed and those who failed the prediction question in each condition. 
Comparisons within each group showed that those participants in the TD group who passed 
the prediction question looked longer (t(12)= -2.209, p = .047) at the original location (.062, 
SD = .045) compared to those who failed (.002, SD = .001). There were no significant 
differences in the clinical groups (all p’s > .05) (see Figure 3).  
FIGURE 3 HERE 
Finally, any differences between those who passed the prediction question and those 
who failed the prediction question were investigated for each of the six scenes within each 
group separately. There was a significant difference in the TD group to the face of the mover 
hiding the game in scene 4 (t(12)= 3.365, p = .006) which was still significant when 
correcting the p-value for multiple comparisons. Those who failed the prediction question 
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looked longer at the face (.140, SD = .099) compared to those who passed (.022, SD = .038). 
Again, there were no differences in the ASD or WS group for any of the scenes.  
Discussion 
The current study was the first to explore looking behaviour while participants with 
ASD and WS were administered a ToM task containing dynamic stimuli. The videos in the 
current task did not include any spoken language and were filmed in black-and-white colours 
in order to prevent the eye movements being guided by saliency of colours or certain aspects 
of the narration (i.e., words, intonation, pauses, etc.). In contrast to previous studies (Klin et 
al. 2002; Riby and Hancock 2009), the current results provide little evidence to support 
different looking behaviours in the clinical groups. For example, those with WS did not show 
a consistent atypical preference for faces: although participants with WS looked longer at the 
face of the human actor at the front of the stage in the false belief condition. This confirms 
previous studies that individuals with WS have difficulties disengaging from faces rather than 
just a preference for faces per se (Riby et al. 2011b). Strikingly, participants with ASD did 
not show avoidance of looking at the faces in favour of objects or looking at the background. 
This might be explained by differences in the stimuli used in that in contrast to previous 
studies the current stimuli included a plain background and thus there was not much for the 
participants with ASD to look at. In addition, the current study included much young children 
compared those reported in previous studies (Klin et al. 2002; Riby and Hancock 2009). 
Finally, there are some important differences in the testing paradigm. For example, in the 
current study participants were asked to view the stimuli freely but they also knew they were 
going to answer some question about the story at the end and thus, the specific instructions 
given to the participant might have impacted on their looking behaviour, thus explaining 
differences in the gaze strategies in the current study compared to previous studies that have 
measured spontaneous behaviour. In addition, there is evidence that those with ASD and WS 
have problems with executive functioning and difficulties with integration of information 
(Bernardino et al. 2012; Happé and Frith 2006; Pellicano 2007; Rhodes et al. 2011). 
Therefore, the use of silent videos in the current study would have reduced memory and 
attention demands allowing the looking behaviours in the clinical groups to be undisturbed 
and similar to control participants. This observation is in line with a previous study by Kelly 
and colleagues (2013) who found that, although there were no basic oculomotor deficits in 
participants with ASD, eyemovements in tasks that included voluntary control aligned with 
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their language abilities: those with language difficulties had difficulties maintaining fixation 
and shifting gaze (see also Norbury et al. 2014). This has a number of consequences for 
educational programmes and future research as it suggests that the type of stimuli used has an 
important impact on performance and looking behaviour for participants with developmental 
disorders (see also van Buijsen et al. 2011; Van Herwegen et al. 2013). Yet, future studies 
will need to directly compare the looking behaviours on a verbal and low-verbal task in order 
to confirm this possibility. Overall, all participants followed the actions depicted in the videos 
by shifting their gaze to the appropriate objects and locations at the appropriate times, e.g. 
shifting their gaze to the new location of the object in scene 4 once the hider moves it from its 
original location.  
Secondly, it was investigated whether there were any differences in looking 
behaviours between those participants who passed and those who failed the prediction 
question. In the TD group there was a significant difference in the amount of time spent 
looking to the original location of the object, in that knowledge about where the object was in 
the first instance provided necessary information about where the seeker would look for the 
object. There were no significant differences for the clinical groups between those who 
passed and those who failed the prediction question. This seems to suggest that although the 
looking behaviour in clinical groups is not necessarily different from typically developing 
controls, those with ASD and WS who pass the false belief task do not use the same 
strategies as typically developing children. Yet, there were a varied number of participants 
who passed and failed within each group and the number of TD participants who failed the 
false belief task was small. In addition, the current study could not exclude children who did 
not answer the memory and reality questions correctly (see Van Herwegen et al 2013 for such 
an approach) when comparing performance on the prediction question due to the uneven 
numbers per group when excluding these children. It can therefore be argued that the looking 
behaviours of children who fail the prediction question as well as the control questions could 
differ from those who passed the control questions. Therefore, further studies are necessary to 
confirm the current findings. In addition, there are a number of limitations in the current 
study. First of all, comparisons to previous studies are difficult, not only because of the small 
number of participants used in these studies in general, but also due to differences in severity 
of the disorder in the clinical groups across different studies. For example, the ASD group in 
the current study did not differ from the TD group for receptive vocabulary scores, which 
suggests that they included mainly high functioning participants with ASD. Yet, the scores 
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from the parental questionnaires CARS contradicts this. This implies that the ASD group 
might have been of very mixed ability. However, some participants in the clinical group did 
not complete the background tasks and for others no accurate age equivalent scores could be 
calculated, meaning that the contribution of cognitive abilities to ToM performance and 
looking behaviours is still unclear. Future studies would therefore need to investigate the 
contribution of cognitive as well as developmental levels to looking behaviours during ToM 
task performance. Secondly, current analyses of eye tracking data vary hugely and need 
further improvements. For example, in our study, the video was divided up into time frames 
thus only proportions of overall looking time to areas of interest were investigated which 
implicitly assumes that “more looking time is better”. However, the ability to shift between 
different areas of interest might be more informative in a social situation than the length of 
looking time to particular areas.  
The current study is the first to evaluate looking behaviour during a ToM task that 
involved dynamic stimuli in which the amount of sensory information was reduced. The 
results show similarities between WS and ASD, two clinical populations that are generally 
assumed to have opposite looking behaviours when viewing social scenes. In addition, there 
were no differences in looking behaviours between those who passed and failed the ToM 
tasks in these clinical groups. Thus, task performance cannot be explained by failure to 
observe information at the appropriate time and factors such as integration of information 
will need to be considered in future studies. The current findings add further data on 
syndrome-specific and syndrome-general differences between WS and ASD which is crucial 
to plan syndrome-specific interventions and educational programmes that would benefit the 
child. 
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Figure 3 Proportion of total dwell time on each AOI for those who passed and those who 




Table 1 Overview of chronological age (in years; months), raw BPVS and RCPM raw scores per 
group. 
 Mean (SD; range) 
Group CA  BPVS Raw score RCPM Raw score 
TD 7;0 (1;03: 4;08-9;04) 72.50 (15.698; 43-101) 27.07 (16.069; 12-35) 
WS 7;06 (1;07: 5;0-10;07) 49.29 (18.424; 19-83) 13.25 (2.417; 8-17) 
ASD 7;08 (1;08: 4;03-10;04) 61.15(29.664; 17-95) 22.20 (5.007; 13-30) 
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Table 2 Number of participants who passed and failed the reality, memory, and prediction of 
action questions as well as the prediction of action question (Prediction final) for those who 
passed the memory and reality questions. 
Group Reality Memory Prediction Prediction final 
 Fail Pass Fail Pass Fail Pass Fail Pass 
TD 0 14 1 13 3 11 2 11 
WS 6 8 7 7 9 5 5 2 
ASD 3 10 1 12 5 8 3 6 
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Table 3 Proportion of total dwell time per group per condition for each of the AOIs 
Area of Interest False Belief 
Mean (SD) 
 TD WS ASD 
1) the face of the mover 0.034 (0.032) 0.019 (0.030) 0.017 (0.030) 
2) the face of the seeker 0.019 (0.024) 0.050 (0.034) 0.046 (0.079) 
3) original location  0.049 (0.047) 0.043 (0.048) 0.050 (0.076) 
 4) new location 0.128 (0.084) 0.072 (0.080) 0.084 (0.076) 
 
  
 
 
